Competition is believed to act as a strong fillip to boost efficiency and lower asymmetric information, which help banks respond better to risks. Therefore, increased banking sector competition is likely to lead to a more stable banking system. However, competition has been claimed to force bank managers to adopt more risky activities in order to compensate for profits erosion originating from offering competitive prices. The fact that these managers do not always take prudent risks could increase financial fragility. Modelling frameworks that have been developed in order to study bank risk-taking behaviour also offer conflicting mechanism for the competition-risk relationship. One strand of the literature assumes that allocation of bank assets is determined by solving a portfolio problem, focusing on the deposit side of the bank balance sheet (Matutes and Vives, 2000) . In this case increased competition would lead to more instability because banks are likely to accept more risky investments in order to cover earnings decline as a result of paying higher deposits rates. Another strand of literature assumes that banks also solve an optimal contracting problem. This kind of moral hazard problem has put competition into a completely new and more positive role. The analysis captures competition on both sides of the bank balance sheet (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005) . In the less competitive market, on the deposit side, banks can earn more rents as previously argued. Nevertheless, banks could also charge higher interest to borrowers on the lending market as well. Facing the higher borrowing rate, borrowers tend to invest in more risky projects; this risk mechanism is exploited further by the moral hazard problem on the bank borrower's side. As a result, banks become more risky in a less competitive market.
One of the early empirical studies on competition and bank risk-taking was conducted by Rhoades and Rutz (1982) on the US. They investigated whether bank managers in concentrated markets would prefer risk-avoidance behaviour in order to enjoy a 'quiet life' due to the lack of competitive pressures. Rhoades and Rutz (1982) found that concentration, measured by the threebank deposit concentration ratio, reduced bank risk-taking alternatively measured by bank profit volatility, the ratio of equity to assets and loans to total assets. Keeley (1990) , on the other hand, employed interest rates on large CDs (well-capitalized banks would be less risky and pay lower rates on large CDs) to proxy for risk and applied Tobin's q (the ratio of market to book value) to proxy for market power. Banks with more market power are assumed to have higher market-tobook assets. Keeley (1990) showed that the relaxation of interstate branching barriers statistically reduced bank market power and banks with less market power tend to take-on excessive risk.
Using another measure of bank risk, the ratio of loan charge-offs to total loans and loan-loss provisions to total loans, Dick (2006) related these risk proxies to branching relaxation as a proxy for market competition. Banks are expected to take-on more risk because geographic diversification may provide a hedge against increased risk. The results reveal that, following the F o r P e e r R e v i e w 4 full removal of geographic restrictions in 1994 in the US, both loan charge-offs and loan-loss provisions increased. In contrast, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) found that branching relaxation sharply reduces bank risk indicated by the decline in loan-loss provisions.
De Nicolo (2000) examined the relationships between bank size, charter value and risk for a sample of listed banks in 21 advanced economies. The market value Z-index was used as an indicator of risk, and this was regressed against bank size measured by the accounting value of bank assets. Larger banks were found to have a higher probability of insolvency (and lower charter values). The results suggest that banks with more market power, indicated by their larger size, take-on more risk. Elaborating on the previous work of De Nicolo (2000) , De Nicolo et al.
(2004) use a sample of banks from 100 countries to explore the effects of consolidation on risk.
They found that at the country level systemic risk measured by an aggregated Z-index was negatively and significantly correlated with concentration, implying that concentrated banking systems are more vulnerable to systemic failure. Boyd et al. (2006) and the equity to assets ratio) and a large sample of banks (8,274 banks from 29 developed nations and 827 from 60 developing nations) they find that in developed countries market power is associated with greater loan risks but lower overall risk (as a consequence of higher capital ratios 
Measures of Competition & the link to Concentration
Generally, competition has been measured in the banking literature by two different approaches. The structural approach examines competition by relying on the structure of the market. It assumes that markets with only a few large banks could foster collusive behaviour and be associated with higher prices than those with many players. For this reason, the level of competition depends on the number and the size of existing banks. This approach, therefore, uses concentration ratios to infer competition and more concentrated markets would be considered as less competitive.
The non-structural approach, on the other hand, relies on bank behaviour to infer competitive condition. Specifically, competition indexes are estimated based on input price factors and bank revenue equations. In this case, competition in markets can be tested using the H-statistic (or other non-structural measures such as the Lerner index -see Jiménez et al., 2007 and Berger et al., 2008) . Therefore, in contrast to the structural approach, researchers using nonstructural approaches, to a certain extent, assume that potential players also impact on the conduct, and subsequently influence competitive condition, of existing players.
One of the non-structural techniques to measure competition is suggested by Panzar and Rosse (1987) -Fillipaki, 2006) . Some attempt to explain the determinants of competition (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Casu and Girardone, 2006) and show that concentration does not necessarily determine the level of competition.
Others, in contrast, use the H-statistic to explain bank performance (Buchs and Mathisen, 2005) or, as we have already discussed, bank risk-taking behaviour (Schaeck et al., 2006 , Yeyati and Micco, 2007 , Berger et al., 2008 .
Another strand of the literature has sought to examine the relationship between concentration and competition. Bikker and Haaf (2002) , for example, found that higher concentration levels lead to lower competition (measured using the H-statistic) across 23
countries. However, Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2004) found that concentration measured by the three-bank concentration ratio leads to lower competition (measured by bank net interest margins) only when regulatory restrictions are eliminated from their estimations. In another study, Beck et al. (2006) found that greater concentration and competition (measured by the lowering of entry and activity restrictions) both lead to reduced systemic risk across their sample of 69 countries. This evidence casts some doubt on the implied inverse link between concentration and competition. Claessens and Laeven (2004) examined the drivers of competition in 50 countries measured by the H-statistic and study found that concentration tended to be positively related to competition and those countries with fewer restrictions tended to be more competitive. Similarly, Casu and Girardone (2006) show no statistically significant link between concentration and competition in European banking, providing conflicting evidence to Bikker and Haaf (2002 
Methodology
This study uses non-structural H-statistic developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987) to measure competition in South East Asian banking systems. The H-statistic is computed from a reduced form revenue equation and equals the sum of elasticities of bank revenue with respect to input prices. In this paper, the H-statistic is estimated for a pooled country sample using the revenue equation as shown in (1):
where the ln and subscripts i, j and t denote natural logarithms, bank i, country j and year t, respectively. r * i,j,t is the ratio of gross interest revenue over total assets (as a proxy for output price of loans). p 1,i,j,t is the ratio of interest expenses over total deposits (as a proxy for input price of deposits). p * 2,i,j,t is the ratio of personnel expenses over total assets (as a proxy for input price of staff). p 3,i,j,t is the ratio of other operating expenses over total assets (as a proxy for input price of bank physical capital). b 1,i,j,t is the ratio of equity over total assets. b 2,i,j,t is the ratio of net loans over total assets. b 3,i,j,t is total assets. d is the time dummies for the years 1999 to 2008, we drop the year dummy for 1998. λ is constant, δ 1 to δ 7 are coefficients and ε i,j,t is the error term. The former three independent variables reflect the price factors of bank inputs while the latter three are control variables. These are included to capture the effects of bank capital levels, risk and bank size, respectively, following Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Goddard and Wilson (2009) .
The H-statistic equals (δ 1 + δ 2 + δ 3 ) in (1) and is interpreted as follows. H is less than or equal to zero if a banking firm is operating in monopolistic markets because in these types of markets, when input prices increase, marginal costs should increase. Firms, subsequently, produce less, leading to the reduction in equilibrium output and firms' revenue (Molyneux et al., 1996, p. 35) . H is positive but less than a unity if the market is characterised by monopolistic competition, namely, when input prices increase firms' revenue also increase but by a smaller proportion than costs (Goddard and Wilson, 2009 in a perfectly competitive market or in a monopolistic market which is perfectly contestable. In this case, when input prices change, marginal and average costs also change and the demand adjusts in the long run so selling price and revenue increase by the same proportion as costs.
The advantages of the H-statistic are that it facilitates the use of bank-level data. Also, it enables one to examine the degree of competition for banks belonging to different ownership types, sizes and specializations (Claessens and Laeven, 2004) . However, the correct calculation of the H-statistic basically relies on one critical assumption. That is, the markets have to be in long-run equilibrium when the data are observed, which can be tested by computing equation (1) using ROA as the dependent variable as shown in equation (2):
where ROA is before-tax return on assets. Because ROA could be a negative number, we transform the dependent variable so that ROA 1 i,j,t = ln(ROA i,j,t + 100) 5 where ROA i,j,t is the original before-tax return on assets. Other variables are similarly defined as those in (1). If longrun equilibrium is satisfied, returns should not be statistically correlated with input prices. That means the sum of elasticities of profits with respect to input prices equals to zero or the E-statistic = (δ 1 + δ 2 + δ 3 ) = 0. When the market is in disequilibrium, input prices are correlated to returns (Molyneux et al., 1996) and therefore the E-statistic is significantly different from zero.
We use two H-statistics corresponding to using either interest revenue or total revenue as the dependent variables in the reduced form revenue model. H 1 refers to the dependent variable, r * i,j,t in (1), in the case where the ratio of gross interest revenue to total assets is used and H 3 when r * i,j,t refers to the ratio of total revenue to total assets 6 .
The H-statistic is computed using three different techniques. First, pooled OLS with time dummies is applied. Second, the fixed-effects GLS is employed as commonly applied in the banking literature, in this case λ = λ i in equation (1). In the OLS and fixed-effects GLS estimation, the H-statistic equals (δ 1 + δ 2 + δ 3 ) in (1). Third, as a further step to check robustness of our estimates, we compute the H-statistic using the one-step system GMM dynamic panel estimator as suggested by Goddard and Wilson (2009) . The model is as follows: 
5 ROA is in percent. 6 We also computed H 2 which equals H 1 but replacing staff costs over total assets by staff costs over loans plus deposits (p * 2,i,j,t ) as a measure of personnel unit price. H 4 equals H 3 but the similar change is also made. This alternative construction of variables is used for comparison of H-statistic which is, later, shown in Table 5 . One of the limitations of the H-statistic, as mentioned, lies in the assumption that the market should be observed in long-run equilibrium. Shaffer (2004) suggests that under disequilibrium conditions, even though statistically a unitary H value is rejected, the actual behaviour of banks may be close to competitive or contestable markets. Goddard and Wilson (2009) argue that, in reality, the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium may be partial rather than instantaneous, driving the market condition out of long-run equilibrium "either occasionally, or frequently, or always". If the adjustment towards equilibrium, responding to changes in input prices, is partial, the static estimation of the H-statistic, as normally applied in empirical studies, could be subject to misspecification. Goddard and Wilson (2009) suggest that, in order to correct for this problem, a dynamic version of the reduced revenue equation should be used to include a lagged dependent variable. And then the long-run equilibrium assumption is no longer necessary because the dynamic estimation enables researchers to incorporate instantaneous adjustments as special circumstances. As such, in the following we use (standard) OLS and fixed-effects GLS estimation to derive H-values as well as the disequilibrium one-step GMM dynamic panel estimator as suggested by Goddard and Wilson (2009) . We choose Blundell and Bond's (1998) system GMM estimator instead of Arellano and Bover's (1995) difference GMM estimator for enhanced estimation efficiency 7 .
We choose four different accounting measures of risk in our study. One of these is loan-loss reserves. The general model implied here is that when loans-loss reserves increase, banks are in a more risky position. However, some may argue that loan-loss reserves may be inversely related to risk because well-reserved banks have substantial resources to cover losses 8 .
For this reason, loan-loss provisions are used as another risk measure. Contrary to loan-loss reserves, loan-loss provisions are flow items, which reflect the actual sum of money banks have already expended to cover loan losses. Both the aforementioned accounting items are closely related to bank credit risk on a loan-by-loan basis, while risk is today more diversified. So, the 7 Linear dynamic panel regression models include one or more lags of the dependent variable as covariates and contain unobserved individual effects (either fixed or random). Arellano and Bond (1991) use a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator for such models, known as the difference GMM. The lagged exogenous variables values (levels) constitute legitimate instruments for the first-differenced, lagged dependent variable. However, these lagged variables may provide little information about the first differences (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) . Building on the work of Arellano and Bover (1995) , Blundell and Bond (1998) developed a system estimator that exploits additional moment conditions on both first-differences and levels, with lagged first-differences of the series employed as instruments in the levels equation. The system GMM estimator reduces potential bias in finite samples as well as asymptotic imprecision associated with the difference estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) . 8 In addition, because loan-loss reserves are stock items, banks managers may determine the timing of these stocks at their discretion to reduce regulatory costs (Altunbas et al., 2007) 
The subscripts i, j and t denote bank i in country j at time t. Risk i,j,t are the risk indicators, alternatively, the ratio of loan-loss reserves over total loans; the ratio of loan-loss provisions over total loans; the volatility of bank after-tax return on assets (the deviation of individual bank's ROA from the sample mean within one year) and the natural logarithm of the Z-index, which is defined as the ratio of the sum of ROA and equity-to-asset ratio over the volatility of ROA.
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Competition j is measured by the various H-statistics computed from equations (1) and (3). Size i,j,t is the natural logarithm of total assets. We control for bank size as it has been found that larger banks face more competitive pressures (De Bandt and Davis, 2000) and may take on higher levels of risk (De Nicolo, 2000) . We include bank Liquidity i,j,t ,the ratio of liquid to total deposits, as one would expect that highly liquid banks encounter less risk because they have excess reserves to cover losses in the case of a crisis, although there is also evidence (Wagner, 2006) that 9 Z-index captures three important components. First, it includes ROA, which is widely used as a measure of bank performance. Second, it includes ROA volatility, a measure of risk used in bank financial management. Thirdly, the index incorporates the bank equity-to-asset ratio (the reciprocal of the equity multiplier). The Zindex has been widely used as measure of the 'safety and soundness' of a banking system (Nash and Sinkey, 1997, p. 96) . Z-index has been used to measure banking sector risk by, for example, Nash and Sinkey (1997) Jagtiani et al., 1995; De Bandt and Davis, 2000; De Nicolo, 2000; Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Claessens and Leaven, 2004; Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 2004; Gelos and Roldos, 2004; Gonzalez, 2005; Beck et al., 2006; Casu and Girardone, 2006; Wagner, 2006; Altunbas et al., 2007; Carbo et al., 2009; and Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009. 11 Because the Z-index can take large negative values, we adjust the value by taking the logarithm of (Z-index + 150) F o r P e e r R e v i e w 11 suggests liquid banks tend to be more risky. The following two bank-level explanatory variables relate to the bank's off-balance sheet items and lending. Off.balance i,j,t is the ratio of off-balance sheet items to total assets and this is included to account for the non-traditional area of bank's business. Angbazo (1997) has shown that off-balance sheet activity can help banks diversify revenue streams and reduce risk whereas Stiroh (2004) suggests the opposite, particularly if there is a large trading component yielding volatile income. Lending i,j,t is the ratio of net loans over total assets and is included to account for bank lending behaviour as this has been shown to be positively related to risk (Altunbas et al., 2007) . Foreign.share i,j,t relates to the proportion of individual bank shares owned by foreigners and is included since foreign ownership may intensify competition as suggested by Gelos and Roldos (2004) and, therefore, could influence bank risk-taking behaviour. The Interest.rate j,t variable reflects the real interest lending rate within the respective countries. This is included to reflect a country's overall macroeconomic condition as banks that operate in countries with higher real interest rates tend to face lower risk (Beck et al., 2006 ) because of the associated lower level of inflation. We also include a Concentration j,t variable, (the ratio of the three largest bank's assets over total banking sector assets) to investigate whether market structure influences risk (Beck et al., 2006 , Berger et al., 2008 , Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009 .
It is widely recognized that more restricted banking systems are shown to hinder competition (Claessens and Laeven, 2004) and can also induce incentives for banks to take-on risk (Barth et al., 2001; Gonzalez, 2005) . As such, we include a composite indicator to account for the restrictiveness of the regulatory environment. Our Regulation j variable is a composite score reflecting bank activity restrictions, banking entry requirements and diversification opportunities. Higher scores reflect more restricted banking environments. Activity restrictions reflect the ability of banks to be involved in securities, insurance and real estate activities; banking entry requirements reflect the types of legal submissions required to obtain a banking license; and diversification reflects whether there are explicit guidelines for asset diversification and whether banks are allowed to make loans abroad or not. This is obtained from Barth et al. (2001) and available from Barth et al. (2006) . We also include yearly dummy variables from 1998 through 2008 (dropping the year dummy for 1998). Barth et al., 2006) .
Data and results
In this section, we first report the H-statistics which are computed using three different estimators under two specifications. The pooled OLS regression is applied to the data first; then, the fixed-effects estimator is employed; finally, the dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM) model developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) is used. Second, the H-statistics from these estimators are compared. Third, the results from the second-stage regressions on competition and risk are reported.
The pooled OLS and fixed-effects GLS estimates of the H-statistic
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The estimates using equation (1) are shown in Tables 1 and 2 , respectively. Overall, input prices of deposits are significantly correlated with bank revenues in all estimates at the 1% level.
Most of other input prices are also positively and significantly correlated with either interest or total revenue in both regressions, except for the case of the price of physical assets for banks in the Philippines, estimated using both OLS and fixed effects estimator. These results are consistent with previous studies (Molyneux et al., 1994; Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Casu and Girardone, 2006) which show that the role of the unit price of deposits is the most important in explaining variation in revenues while that of physical capital is the least important. This may suggest that banks with 14 This is estimated for a pooled country sample yielding one H-statistic for each country. We have tried to compute yearly H-statistics following Molyneux et al. (1994) and Yeyati and Micco (2007) . The H-statistics are all significantly different from zero and unity suggesting that banks in the region earn revenues as if operating under monopolistic competition. This result is consistent with most earlier empirical findings (see Appendix I).
TABLES 1 & 2 around here
Tests for long-run equilibrium condition
Because the H-statistic is based on an assumption of long-run equilibrium, we conduct the equilibrium test by estimating equation (2) using OLS and fixed-effects corresponding to those methods used to estimate the H-statistic. The E-statistics from the equilibrium tests, displayed in Table 3 , show that the behaviour of banks in most cases are observed in long-run equilibrium between 1998 and 2008 although the banking systems of Indonesia and the Philippines exhibited some evidence of disequilibrium conditions (using OLS estimates).
TABLES 3 around here
The disequilibrium conditions found in Indonesia and the Philippines raise certain concerns because the computation of the H-statistic breaks the critical assumption. The result is again in-line with previous empirical evidence (see Appendix I). This is supported in arguments by Goddard and Wilson (2009) who state that in practice adjustments towards long-run equilibrium are not always instantaneous. In this case, inferring competition conditions from the H-statistic for Indonesia and the Philippines using these estimates are likely to be biased.
Static versus dynamic H-statistic
In order to deal with the non-equilibrium conditions we adopt the dynamic panel estimator following Goddard and Wilson (2009) to compute the H-statistic.
TABLES 4 and 5 around here
The results of the dynamic H-statistics are reported in Table 4 . First, regarding the lagged dependent variables, the positive and statistically significant coefficients show a persistence of 
Evidence on the impact of competition on risk
The results reported in Table 6 , 7 and 8, show that competition does not induce incentives for banks to take-on more risk. Most of our estimates show an inverse relationship between competition and risk statistically significant at the 1% level. These findings concur with the results of Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) , De Nicolo (2000), Boyd et al. (2006) , Yeyati and Micco (2007) and Koetter and Poghosyan (2009) , but conflict with those reported by Rhoades and Rutz (1982) , Keeley (1990) and Dick (2006) . We also find some evidence that large banks are less likely to be involved in risky activities compared with small banks. This maybe because of the realization of efficiency benefits via economies of scale or risk reduction through diversification (Liang and Rhoades, 1988; Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Shiers, 2002) . Surprisingly, banks with higher volumes of lending tend to face lower level of risk (reflected in a lower level of loan loss reserve). We actually find positive relationship between lending and risk over the period from 1998 to 2004 but this reverses (presumably because of the booming SE Asian economies) when the study period is extended to 2008. We also find evidence that foreign banks are safer than their domestic counterparts. Liquidity fails to enter the regressions significantly, indicating no significant impact on bank's risk-taking behaviour, while off-balance sheet shows some evidence of positive impact on bank's riskiness, albeit the coefficients are rather small (near zero). 22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46 Notes: P-values are in parentheses. OLS and FE mean the results from the estimation of (2), using pooled OLS and fixed-effects respectively. Both models are estimated with time dummies (but not reported). Ln(p1) = natural logarithm of interest expenses over deposits; ln(p*2) = natural logarithm of personnel expenses over total assets; ln(p3) = natural logarithm of other operating expenses over total assets; ln(b1) = natural logarithm of net loans over total assets; ln(b2) = natural logarithm of equity capital over total assets; ln(b3) = natural logarithm of total assets. * Significant at 0.1 level, ** significant at 0.05 level and *** significant at 0.01 level Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Spec 1 uses the natural logarithm of interest income over total assets while Spec 3 uses the natural logarithm of total income over total assets as the dependent variable in equation (3). The results are estimated from one-step dynamic panel generalized method of moments developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) . L.ln(r * 1) = natural logarithm of the lagged dependent variable; ln(p1) = natural logarithm of interest expenses over deposits; ln(p*2) = natural logarithm of personnel expenses over total assets; ln(p3) = natural logarithm of other operating expenses over total assets; ln(b1) = natural logarithm of net loans over total assets; ln(b2) = natural logarithm of equity capital over total assets; ln(b3) = natural logarithm of total assets. 'Hansenp' is the p-value of the Hansen test statistic of over-identifying restrictions, while AR(2) is the p-value of the second order autocorrelation test statistic. Pvalues of the estimated coefficients are reported in brackets. Year dummies from 1999 through 2008 are included in the model but not reported in the table. *, **, and *** represent 10, 5 and 1 percent significance level, respectively. Note: For brevity, individual coefficients are unreported. Spec 1 = bank interest revenue over total assets as the dependent variable; unit cost of labour is measured by personnel expenses over total assets, Spec 2 = unit cost of labour is measured by personnel expenses over loans plus deposits, Spec 3 = bank total revenue over total assets as the dependent variable, unit cost of labour is measured similarly to Spec 1, Spec 4 = the dependent variable is the same as that of Spec 3 but unit cost of labour is measured by personnel expenses over loans plus deposits. All other variables are as defined in equations (1) and (3). OLS, FE and GMM are H-statistics computed using OLS, fixed-effects (applied to equation 1) and generalized method of moments dynamic estimator (applied to equation 3), respectively. Note: Hb1 = H-statistic estimated by OLS in the first stage through specification 1 where interest income is used as the dependent variable in equation (1). Hb3 = H-statistic estimated using OLS in the first stage through specification 3 where total income is the dependent variable in equation (1). LLR = loan-loss reserves over total loans; LLP = loan-loss provisions over total loans; ROA volatility = the deviation of individual bank's ROA from the sample mean within one period; Z-index = (ROA + EAR)/ROA volatility where ROA = net income over total assets and EAR = equity capital over total assets. The second stage is estimated by applying heteroskedasticity-consistent OLS to equation (4). P-values are in parentheses. Year dummies from 1999 through 2008 are included in the model but not reported. Mean VIF = mean value of the variance inflation factor, used to test for multicollinearity in the regression. As the rule of thumb, if VIF exceeds 10, multicollinearity is severe. * Significant at 0.1 level, ** significant at 0.05 level and *** significant at 0.01 level. Note: Hf 1 = H-statistic estimated by fixed-effects GLS in the first stage through specification 1 where interest income is used as the dependent variable in equation (1). Hf 3 = H-statistic estimated using the fixed-effects GLS in the first stage through specification 3 where total income is the dependent variable in equation (1). LLR = loan-loss reserves over total loans; LLP = loan-loss provisions over total loans; ROA volatility = the deviation of individual bank's ROA from the sample mean within one period; Z-index = (ROA + EAR)/ROA volatility where ROA = net income over total assets and EAR = equity capital over total assets. The second stage is estimated by applying heteroskedasticity-consistent OLS to equation (4). P-values are in parentheses. Year dummies from 1999 through 2008 are included in the model but not reported. Mean VIF = mean value of variance inflation factor, used to test for multicollinearity in the regression. As the rule of thumb, if VIF exceeds 10 multicollinearity is severe. * Significant at 0.1 level, ** significant at 0.05 level and *** significant at 0.01 level. Note: Hd1 = H-statistic estimated using the dynamic panel estimator in the first stage through specification 1 where interest income is the dependent variable in equation (3). Hd3 = H-statistic estimated using the dynamic panel estimator in the first stage through specification 3 where total income is as the dependent variable in equation (3). LLR = loan-loss reserves over total loans; LLP = loan-loss provisions over total loans; ROA volatility = the deviation of individual bank's ROA from the sample mean within one period; Z-index = (ROA + EAR)/ROA volatility where ROA = net income over total assets and EAR = equity capital over total assets. The second stage is estimated by applying heteroskedasticity-consistent OLS to equation (4). P-values are in parentheses. Year dummies from 1999 through 2008 are included in the model but not reported. Mean VIF = mean value of variance inflation factor, used to test for multicollinearity in the regression. As the rule of thumb, if VIF exceeds 10 multicollinearity is severe. * Significant at 0.1 level, ** significant at 0.05 level and *** significant at 0.01 level. (1992 ( -1996 ( ) No (1997 ( -2000 Turk-Ariss ( 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47 
